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The Consolidated Audit Trail: An Overreaction to the 
Danger of Flash Crashes from High Frequency Trading 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 6, 2010, $1 trillion of securities’ market value 
dissipated in less than thirty minutes.1 The  rapid decline of market  
value is now known as the “Flash Crash.”2 During the Flash Crash,  
some blue-chip stocks such as Proctor & Gamble lost 36% of their 
value,3 while other stocks like Accenture lost 99% of their value.4  In  
just twenty minutes on the afternoon of the Flash Crash, stock 
exchanges processed 20,000 trades, spanning more than 300 securities, 
which traded at a price 60% higher or lower than the securities’ prices 
earlier that afternoon.5 High Frequency Trading (“HFT”)6 received the 
majority of the blame for the extreme loss of market value.7 The Flash 
Crash  began  when  a  HFT  hedge  fund,8  using an  incorrectly inputted 
 
 
1. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 704 (2013). 
2. Id.; Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2014). 
3. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 525. 
4. Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the 
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1703 (2012). 
5. Id. 
6. HFT funds buy or sell securities at speeds not obtainable by humans because of the 
use of algorithms that allow the HFT funds to react to market news before humans can 
decide whether to buy or sell. See Matthew O’Brien, High Speed Trading Isn’t About 
Efficiency—It’s About Cheating, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/02/high-speed-trading-isnt-about- 
efficiency-its-about-cheating/283677/?single_page=true. 
7. See REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS 
OF MAY 6, 2010, at 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (describing how the 
improper execution of a sell algorithm was a direct cause of the Flash Crash). 
8. A HFT hedge fund operates much like a normal hedge fund, except its primary way 
to derive income is from the use of complex algorithms that operate at speeds not attainable 
by other investors. See Katherine Burton, Citadel Fund Said to Quadruple with High- 
Frequency Trades, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/citadel-fund-said-to-quadruple-with-high- 
frequency-trades.html (explaining that Citadel LLC is a hedge fund that started as a high 
frequency strategy fund). 
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algorithm, executed a multi-billion dollar trade in mere minutes that 
would normally take hours.9 The trade produced a domino effect  of 
HFT funds instantaneously selling large blocks of the same securities to 
each other,10 resulting in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (“Dow”) 
dropping 9.16% at the height of the Flash Crash.11 
Similarly, during the “Black Monday” crash of October 19, 
1987, the markets fell more than 20% and did not fully recover for 
almost two years.12 Unlike the Black Monday crash, the markets during 
the Flash Crash recovered most of the trillion-dollar loss in minutes.13 
Four years later, however, investors still fear another flash crash and the 
resulting harm.14 Fortunately, the Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) has promulgated regulations that provide increased  
surveillance of the markets and more effective control over severe 
market disruptions like the Flash Crash.15 
On August 1, 2012, the SEC promulgated Rule 613 mandating 
the   eighteen16     Self-Regulatory   Organizations   (“SROs”)17     and  the 
 
 
 
9. REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Lin, supra note 1, at 704; Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527. 
12. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527. 
13. Id. 
14. Steven Russolillo, Flash Crash, Four Years Later, Still Haunts Wall Street, WALL 
ST. J. MONEYBEAT (May 6, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/05/06/ 
flash-crash-four-years-later-still-haunts-wall-street/. 
15. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified  at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
16. The SROs consist of the BATS BYX Exchange, BATS BZX Exchange, BOX 
Options Exchange, C2 Options Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange,  Chicago 
Stock Exchange, EDGA Exchange, EDGX Exchange, International Securities Exchange, 
ISE Gemini, MIAX Options Exchange, Nasdaq OMX BX, Nasdaq OMX PHLX, National 
Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Arca, NYSE MKT, and the Nasdaq 
Stock Market. CAT NMS Plan Participants, http://catnmsplan.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 
2015). 
17. Securities industry SROs “existed before federal securities laws were enacted in 
1933 and 1934” as “private sector membership organizations of securities industry 
professionals.” Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry  Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151 
(2008). “They set standards of conduct for their members and disciplined errant members.” 
Id. In recent history, SROs “have become integrated into the scheme of federal statutory 
regulation” and the SEC now has “oversight of all their activities.” Id. They still, however, 
play a role in controlling the national exchanges notwithstanding SEC oversight. See Order 
Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address Extraordinary 
Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. 33498, 33500 (June 6, 2012) (showing that the SROs 
submitted the Plan that the SEC then adopted). 
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Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)18  to  jointly submit 
a National Market System (“NMS”) plan, which requires them to create 
and implement a Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”).19 Congress 
developed the NMS in 1975 in order to ensure a readily accessible, 
efficient, and fair market place.20 Rule 613 aims to further the goals of 
the NMS by giving regulators more effective control and surveillance of 
the markets in a time of increased electronic trading.21 Rule 613 also 
allows regulators to track all NMS security22 activity in an efficient and 
accurate manner.23 The rule mandates that each national security 
exchange and FINRA provide detailed information—including 
origination, modification, cancellation, routing, and  execution—on 
every quote, order, and trade across all NMS exchanges.24 Every quote, 
order, and trade must be reported into a central repository by the next 
trading day in order for the SEC and the SROs to monitor and analyze 
 
 
18. FINRA is an independent non-profit organization dedicated to investor protection 
and efficient regulation of the securities industry. About FINRA, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). Congress 
authorized FINRA to protect investors and FINRA does so by writing and enforcing rules 
governing the activities of over 4,100 securities firms with approximately 640,000 brokers. 
Id. Furthermore, FINRA is a “private nonprofit funded from fees from the exchanges as  
well as from the Wall Street brokerages it regulates.” Silla Brush & Matthew Phillips, An 
SEC Computer to Peer into Wall Street’s Dark Pools, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Aug. 11, 
2014, at 28–29. 
19. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723. 
20. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 
834 (2001) (explaining that Congress developed the NMS out of a desire for efficient 
execution of transactions, fair competition between exchanges and markets, readily  
available quotes, the ability to execute orders in the best market, and so investors could 
execute orders without the participation of a dealer). 
21. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Consolidated Audit Trail 
System to Better Track Market Trades (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-86.htm. 
22. A NMS security is “any security or class of securities for which transaction reports 
are collected, processed, and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting 
plan, or an effective national market system plan for reporting transaction in listed options.” 
17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46) (2014). “In general the term NMS security refers to exchange- 
listed equity securities and standardized options, but does not include exchange-listed debt 
securities, securities futures, or open-end mutual funds, which are not currently reported 
pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan.” Responses to Frequently Asked 
Questions Concerning Large Trader Reporting, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/large-trader-faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
23. Fact Sheet: Creating a Consolidated Audit Trail,  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N  
(July 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171492567#.U_Xq_ 
M9MvX4 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] 
24. Id. 
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the markets.25 
The rise of HFT and the subsequent Flash Crash also forced the 
SEC to adopt additional regulations to combat flash crashes.26 These 
regulations such as the limit-up-limit-down mechanism, erroneous trade 
rules, market access regulations, and large trader reporting rules 
substantially limit the possibility future flash crashes.27 Regardless of  
the financial costs28 and immense data privacy concerns,29 the SEC 
promulgated Rule 613.30 For instance, the CAT will record over 50 
billion daily transactions and monitor over 100 million customer 
accounts, making it the largest transaction securities database in the 
world.31 On September 30, 2014, the SROs and FINRA submitted the 
NMS plan,32 which estimates an average total five year cost of $255 
million.33 
The NMS plan provides an iteration of the CAT—while cost 
friendly relative to initial estimates34—that is neither substantially 
effective, nor necessary in light of previous efforts to combat flash 
crashes. This Note discusses HFT, its potential dangers and effects, and 
the regulations attempting to control the dangers and effects. 
Additionally, the Note analyzes the CATs goals, potential problems,  
and costs. Part II provides an overview of HFT, how it affects the 
market  landscape,  and  its function  and  goals.35  Part  III examines the 
 
 
25. Id. 
26. See Ken Sweet, ‘Flash Crash’ Worries Go Global, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2011, 
11:09 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/06/markets/flash_crash/index.htm. 
27. See infra Part IV.A–D. 
28. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 39, at 1948, 1948 (Oct. 6, 2014) (estimating the CAT to cost over $500 million 
over its first five years of implementation). 
29. See Yin Vilczek, SEC Adopts Rule for Consolidated Audit Trail; Dissenters Object 
to Change From Proposal, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1359 (July 16, 2012) 
(offering an overview of the amount of data that must be reported to the central repository of 
the CAT). 
30. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified  at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
31. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28. 
32. Letter from the Parties to the National Market System Plan Governing the 
Consolidated Audit Trail to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 30, 
2014) [hereinafter Joint NMS Plan Letter], available at http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups 
/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p600989.pdf. 
33. Id. 
34. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28. 
35. See infra Part II. 
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causes and repercussions of the Flash Crash.36 Part IV analyzes SEC 
regulations concerning market control, how they function, why they are 
important to prevent extreme market volatility, and the effectiveness of 
each regulation.37 Part V examines the purpose and need for the NMS 
Plan, why the adopted iteration of the CAT is ineffective, and conflicts 
of interest arising from Rule 613.38 Part VI discusses the potential costs 
of the CAT, specifically the actual financial costs and potential privacy 
costs.39 Lastly, Part VII summarizes why the CAT is an overreaction to 
the dangers of flash crashes.40 
II. UNDERSTANDING HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
The switch from pen and paper to computer and keyboard in the 
digital world produced the need for HFT.41  While the advent of HFT42  
is inconclusive, some familiar with HFT suggested it originated around 
1999.43 Since 1999, traders yelling out bids and asks on the  trading  
floor actually represent few, if any, trades.44   Instead, HFT funds make a 
 
 
36. See infra Part III. 
37. See infra Part IV. 
38. See infra Part V. 
39. See infra Part VI. 
40. See infra Part VII. 
41. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use  
and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 2010). 
42. A literature review released by the SEC identified five characteristics that are often 
attributed to HFT: 
 
1. Use of Extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for 
generating, routing, and executing orders. 
2. Use of co-location services and individuals data feeds offered by 
exchanges and others to minimize network and other latencies. 
3. Very-short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions. 
4. Submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after 
submission. 
5. Ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible. 
 
STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING AND MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE  LITERATURE  REVIEW: PART  II: HIGH  FREQUENCY  TRADING  4  (Mar.  18, 2014) 
[hereinafter EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf. 
43. Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and Its Impact on Market Quality 5 
(July 6, 2010) (unpublished thesis, Northwestern University), available at 
http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/HFT_Trading.pdf. 
44. McGowan, supra note 41, ¶ 1. 
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majority of trades.45 HFT funds can operate as part of a  large  hedge 
fund with many different income streams, or funds that derive income 
only from HFT.46 “HFT is one of the most significant market structure 
developments in recent years” and impacts an overwhelming majority  
of the market’s performance.47 Algorithmic trading48 is the  heart of 
HFT, and these algorithms continually evolve in both complexity and 
speed.49 
HFT funds differ from the average investor because they use 
computers and algorithms to trade at speeds and intelligences not 
attainable by humans.50 The incredible speeds at  which  HFT  funds 
trade (milliseconds or less) result in increased profits because of the 
infinitesimal distortions among prices across exchanges.51 Using 
computer derived algorithms, HFT funds profit by moving in and out of 
positions at faster rates than the average investor.52 HFT funds can also 
determine market distortions more quickly and more efficiently than the 
average investor.53  For example, large mutual fund A executes a trade  
to sell two million shares of Apple.54 The trade induces a momentary  
dip in the price of Apple stock because the market is now saturated with 
two million more shares of Apple stock.55 The HFT funds’ algorithms 
instantaneously execute a trade to buy56 Apple stock during the brief 
decline in price and proceed to sell it shortly thereafter at the normal 
 
 
45. See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, supra note 42, at 4 (“While not a vast majority, 
most estimates suggest that HFT contribute to at least 50% of trades executed.”). 
46. Burton, supra note 8. 
47. Id. 
48. “A group of researchers has identified the following helpful common 
characteristics of algorithmic trading as (1) the use of pre-designed trading decisions; (2) 
implementation by professional traders; (3) automated observation of market data in real 
time; (4) automated order submission; (5) automated order management; (6) lack of pre- 
trade human intervention; and (7) use of direct market access (in other words, the trader’s 
computer interfaces directly with the exchange’s computerized trading system).” Korsmo, 
supra note 2, at 538–39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49. See McGowan, supra note 41, ¶ 2. 
50.    Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
51.    Id. ¶ 15. 
52.   Id. 
53.    Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
54. See Bill Conerly, High Frequency Trading Explained Simply, FORBES (Apr. 4, 
2011, 2:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2014/04/14/high-frequency- 
trading-explained-simply/. 
55. Id. 
56. HFT funds also do the inverse and short sell stocks, when they detect a stock rising 
in price that will drop in price shortly thereafter. Id. 
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price.57 
Simply detecting the dip in stock price more quickly than the 
average investor, however, does not guarantee the HFT fund will 
profit.58 The HFT fund must distinguish between short blips in prices 
and overall trends in the market because the former results in profits for 
the HFT fund, while the latter may not.59 The difficulty  of 
distinguishing between a blip and a trend requires more effective and 
complex algorithms.60 Even with HFT profits declining since their peak 
in 2009, HFT still constitutes a majority of trades in the United States 
and, therefore, substantially impacts U.S. securities’ markets.61 
III. THE FLASH CRASH OF MAY 6, 2010 
 
The SEC blamed the Flash Crash on HFT, notwithstanding the 
negative financial landscape leading up to the Flash Crash on the 
morning of May 6, 2010.62 Negative political and economic news 
concerning the European debt crisis loomed large,63 leading market 
participants to increase their aversion to risk.64 For  instance,  gold 
futures rose 2.5% as investors engaged in a “flight to quality.”65 Even 
after acknowledging heightened conditions for market volatility, 
however, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) determined, after four months of analyzing and examining 
trading data from the day of the Flash Crash, that HFT substantially 
caused the Flash Crash.66 
The first domino falling on the day of the Flash Crash occurred 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61.    Id. at 542. 
62. See REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–3 (explaining the backdrop of a volatile market, yet 
describing how a HFT fund’s improperly executed order led to extreme volatility). 
63. Id. at 1. 
64. See id. at 9. 
65. Id. Because of its status as a safe investment, buying gold is considered a “flight to 
quality.” See Frank Tang & Clara Denina, PRECIOUS—Gold Rises to 2-Week High as 
Equities Slide on Growth, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/09/markets-precious-idUSL3N0S42TN20141009 
(stating that when market participants lose faith in equities they sometimes start investing 
more heavily in relatively safe investments, such as gold). 
66. See REPORT, supra note 7, at 2–5 (detailing how the HFT fund’s improperly 
inputted algorithm started a chain reaction which lead to the substantial market loss). 
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when a HFT fund in Kansas (“Waddell & Reed”)67 initiated a trade to 
sell 75,000 E-Mini68 contracts, valued at  $4.1  billion.69  Waddell & 
Reed designed the trade to execute sell orders of June 2010 E-Mini 
contracts until it reached a pre-calculated point of volume.70 Waddell & 
Reed, however, neglected to program the algorithm to include price or 
time as part of the inputs.71 Because of the improper inputs, the 
algorithm executed the trade in only twenty minutes, whereas a 
comparable trade of similar size normally takes days to execute.72 By 
comparison, Waddell & Reed previously placed an identical-sized order 
that took over five hours to execute because the algorithm included time 
and price as inputs.73 
Shortly after Waddell & Reed executed the trade, other HFT 
funds reacted by buying E-Mini futures because their algorithms 
predicted E-Mini futures returning to normal levels.74 As other HFT 
funds commenced trading E-Mini futures, however, Waddell & Reed’s 
faulty algorithm proceeded to fill its original order even faster because 
of the increased volume, without regard to price. 75 A combination of  
the pressure from Waddell & Reed’s algorithm and other HFT funds 
reacting to Waddell & Reed’s trading resulted in the price of E-Mini 
futures declining by 3% in four minutes.76 Shortly thereafter, the HFT 
funds rapidly bought and then resold contracts among each other, 
resulting in the same position passing back and forth.77 
The Dow had not witnessed such volatility and loss of value in 
 
 
 
67. Marcy Gordon & Daniel Wagner, ‘Flash Crash Report: Waddell & Reed Blamed 
for Market Plunge’, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Dec. 1, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/01/flash-crash-report-one-41_n_747215.html. 
68. The E-Mini is “designed to track stocks in the S&P 500 Index.” REPORT, supra  
note 7, at 10; see Korsmo, supra note 2, at 568 n. 219 (“The holder of an E-Mini contract is 
entitled to a payment of 50 times the value of the S&P 500 index at the time the contract 
expires. The E-Mini is one of the most widely traded stock market index futures contract, 
allowing both speculation and hedging of other positions.”). 
69. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2; Lin, supra note 1, at 704. 
70. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Lin, supra note 1, at 704. 
75. REPORT, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
76. Id. at 15. 
77. See id. at 3 (stating that in twelve seconds HFT funds traded over 27,000 contracts, 
49% of the total volume, but only bought an additional 200 contracts). 
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such a short period of time since Black Monday78 in 1987.79  Many of  
the other 8,000 individual equity securities and exchange traded funds 
(“ETFs”)80 suffered price declines of up to 15%, but recovered most of 
their loss by the end of the trading day.81 Some stocks traded for a  
penny or less and then quickly returned to their pre-crash levels.82 
Stocks such as Apple and Sothebys traded at $100,000, when they 
opened the day around $25083 and $34,84 respectively, only to return to 
opening day prices shortly thereafter.85 In whole, $1 trillion worth of 
securities’ market value dissipated in thirty minutes. 86 
Days of extreme volatility similar to the Flash Crash must be 
avoided because they detrimentally impact investors’ confidence in the 
market.87 Equity markets were envisioned as a place where individual 
investors could use their capital to invest in growing companies.88 
Individual investment also lowers the cost of capital for companies and 
increase the rate of return for investors, thereby benefiting both  
investors and companies.89 The ability of one HFT fund to commence a 
string of actions pushing a $30 stock to a penny, however, gives the 
individual investor “little incentive to risk their capital.”90 
 
78. Financial analysts determined that commodity futures trading was the leading 
precipitating factor of the market crash in 1987. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy 
Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New 
Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 1998–99 (1988). Specifically, the use of futures to 
hedge, resulting in pseudo “portfolio insurance”, was cited as a reason for the crash. Id. 
79. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526. 
80. ETF’s are similar to mutual funds in that they are both pools of investments, but 
while an ETF’s price changes throughout the trading day, a mutual fund’s price is set at the 
end of each trading day. Michael Chamberlain, What’s the Difference? Mutual Funds and 
Exchange Traded Funds Explained, FORBES (July 18, 2013, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/2013/07/18/whats-the-difference-mutual-funds- 
and-exchange-traded-funds-explained/. For example, during trading days an ETF has a 
continuous bid and ask price, while the price of the mutual fund for the trading day is the 
price determined at the end of the previous trading day. Id. Furthermore, the operating 
expenses of ETFs are less than a mutual fund, and they are treated different for tax purposes. 
Id. 
81. REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
82. Id. 
83. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527. 
84. Lin, supra note 1, at 704. 
85. Id.; see Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526–27. 
86. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526. 
87. Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the Flash 
Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476 (2012). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90.    Id. at 1474. 
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IV. REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN RESPONSE TO THE FLASH CRASH 
 
In order to prevent another Flash Crash, the SEC responded with 
regulations addressing market volatility mechanisms, clearly erroneous 
trade protection, risk management for broker-dealers, and large trader 
reporting requirements.91 All of the regulations that the  SEC 
promulgated work in conjunction with each other to more thoroughly 
and effectively regulate the market to prevent flash crashes.92 
Additionally, even the large trader reporting requirement, rendered 
somewhat redundant by the CAT, continues to exist after the 
implementation of the CAT.93 If the regulations prove as effective as 
intended, however, the need for the CAT to help prevent flash crashes 
becomes considerably diminished. 
 
A. Market Volatility Mechanisms:  Market-Wide Circuit Breakers, 
Single-Stock Circuit Breakers, and Limit Up-Limit Down 
Mechanism 
 
On June 10, 2010, barely a month after the Flash Crash, the SEC 
approved new rules on a pilot basis94 that expanded circuit breaker 
regulations.95 Market circuit breakers pause all trading activity if the 
“benchmark index”96 that the circuit breakers are tied to decreases to a 
set percentage relative to the previous trading day.97 The New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) instituted market circuit breakers in October 
 
 
 
91. Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
92. See id. 
93. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45733–34 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
94. The U.S. exchanges and FINRA proposed the rules in response to the Flash Crash. 
See Investor Bulletin: New Stock by Stock Circuit Breakers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakers.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 
Investor Bulletin]. 
95. Id. 
96. The Dow was the benchmark index for the original market circuit breakers. NYSE 
Market Model: Circuit Breakers, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/market-model 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
97. Testimony Concerning the Severe Market Disruption on May 6, 2010, Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., 111th Cong. 11–12 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro Testimony] 
(statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (stating that at its lowest 
decline from the previous day close the Dow had declined 9.16%, which was not enough to 
trigger the 10% market circuit breakers). 
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1989, following the Black Monday98 crash in October 1987, in order to 
“reduce volatility and promote investor confidence.”99 The pause in 
trading offers an investor time to decipher information surrounding the 
decline, and make informed decisions regarding high market 
volatility.100 The NYSE last updated the  original  market  circuit 
breakers in 1998.101 The original market circuit breakers paused trading 
for a set duration if the Dow declined 10%, 20%, or 30%, compared to 
the previous close of the Dow.102 These market circuit breakers were in 
effect during the Flash Crash, but failed to trigger because the Dow did 
not fall below the 10% threshold.103 In response to the Flash Crash not 
triggering the existing market circuit  breakers, the SEC moved swiftly 
to approve rules to expand the circuit breaker program.104 
Citing “disparate trading rules and conventions across the 
exchanges,” as a basis for the Flash Crash, then SEC Chairwoman Mary 
Shapiro deemed uniform circuit breakers of great importance to combat 
future times of high market volatility.105 Shapiro explained that “[single 
stock circuit breakers] across exchanges would limit volatility” and 
would “increase market transparency, [and] bolster investor 
protection.”106 The new single stock circuit breaker rules instituted a 
“uniform market-wide pause in trading in individual stocks whose price 
moves 10% or more in a five-minute period.”107 The five-minute pause 
gives the markets an opportunity to “establish a reasonable market 
price[]” and “resume trading in a fair and orderly fashion.”108 The SEC 
implemented single stock circuit breakers in three phases, culminating  
in all NMS securities being subjected to single stock circuit breaker 
 
98. On October 19, 1987, the market fell 22.6% and lost $500 billion in one day. Mark 
Koba, Market Circuit Breakers: CNBC Explains, CNBC.COM (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/44059883#. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Shapiro Testimony, supra note 97, at 11. 
102. Id. at 1. 
103. Id. at 2. 
104. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94. 
105. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC to Publish for Public Comment 
Stock-by Stock Circuit Breaker Rule Proposals (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-117.htm. 
106. Id. 
107. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94. 
108. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Rules Expanding Stock- 
by Stock Circuit Breakers and Clarifying Process for Breaking Erroneous Trades (Sept. 10, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-167.htm. 
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rules.109 While swift action was taken after the Flash Crash, the SEC 
only applied single stock circuit breaker rules on a pilot basis and 
ultimately replaced them in 2012 when the SEC adopted new proposals 
to curb market volatility.110 
On May 31, 2012, the SEC adopted two proposals, overhauling 
how exchanges dealt with flash crashes.111 The first proposal updated 
market wide circuit breakers.112 The second proposal, the “limit up- 
limit-down” mechanism, replaced the existing single stock circuit 
breakers that expired on July 31, 2012.113 The new market wide circuit 
breaker rules decreased the thresholds that trigger a trading pause to  
7%, 13%, and 20% from 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively.114 
Additionally, the SEC will calculate the triggering values daily, and the 
S&P 500 replaced the Dow as the reference index used to calculate the 
trigger points of a trading halt.115 
The second proposal established a limit up-limit down 
mechanism.116 The limit up-limit down mechanism “intend[s] to reduce 
the negative impacts of sudden unanticipated price movements” similar 
to those that happened during the Flash Crash.117 The mechanism 
establishes price bands,118 and if an individual NMS stock moves 
outside of its price band for more than fifteen seconds, the exchanges 
pause trading on the stock for five minutes.119 The plan established 
different tiers of securities resulting in different price bands for different 
 
109. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94 (providing that phase one subjected stocks 
listed on the S&P 500 to the rules, phase two subjected securities listed on the Russell 2000 
and Exchange Traded funds to the rules, and phase three subjected all NMS securities to the 
rules). 
110. See Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 108. 
111. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Proposals to Address 
Extraordinary Volatility in Individual Stocks and Broader Stock Market (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171482422#.VNBTO4fxT 
FI. 
112. Id. 
113. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address 
Extraordinary Market Volatility 77 Fed. Reg. 33498, 33500 (June 6, 2012). 
114. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 111. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address 
Extraordinary Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. at 33501. 
118. The upper and lower price bands are based on a reference price which is the mean 
price of reported transactions for the NMS stock over the preceding five minute period. Id. 
119. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address 
Extraordinary Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. at 33501. 
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securities.120 For example, Tier 1 NMS securities—securities in the  
S&P 500 Index, Russell 1000 Index, and certain ETFs—with a price of 
more than $3 use a 5% percentage parameter, instead of the previous 
10% parameter.121 Tier 2122 NMS Stocks with a price greater than $3  
use a 10% percentage parameter, instead of the previous 20% 
parameter.123 
 
B. Clearly Erroneous Trades 
 
On September 16, 2010, the SEC adopted new rules regulating 
clearly erroneous trades.124  During a  twenty minute period on the day  
of the Flash Crash, exchanges processed many trades, in different 
securities, at prices differing 60% from their pre-Flash Crash level.125 
The National Security Exchanges, along with FINRA, invalidated all 
trades executed at levels 60% or more away from  preceding  levels 
under their erroneous trade execution authority.126 This erroneous trade 
authority, however, could only be authorized during extraordinary 
market conditions.127 
Yet, the exchanges did not have uniform rules on precisely how 
to determine if the trades were erroneous.128 Some exchanges designate 
erroneous trades by calculating if the price of a stock exceeded a 
parameter percentage based on the preceding market price, while other 
exchanges give power to their officials to label trades erroneous.129 The 
lack of transparency in determining the 60% figure to break trades could 
lead to confusion and uncertainty during a flash crash.130 As a  result,  
the SEC adopted uniform guidelines on breaking erroneous trades.131 
The new rules on breaking erroneous trades provide a uniform 
 
120. Id. 
121.    Id. at 33514–15. 
122. All stocks that are not Tier 1 NMS stocks. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous 
Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56613 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
125. REPORT supra note 7, at 1. 
126. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous 
Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56614. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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standard that reduces investor uncertainty about the determinations of 
erroneous trades.132 Then SEC Chairwoman Shapiro stated, “Adopting 
consistent standards . . . will strengthen the resiliency of our markets . . . 
especially during periods of high market volatility.”133 The clearly 
erroneous trade rules vest power in the exchange to break a trade if the 
price exceeded the consolidated last sale price by more than a specified 
percentage amount.134 Stocks priced under twenty-five dollars must 
deviate at least 10% in order to be considered broken by exchanges.135 
Stocks priced between twenty-five and fifty dollars must deviate at least 
5%, while stocks priced over fifty dollars must deviate at least 3%.136 
Further, erroneous trade review must commence within thirty minutes  
of the erroneous trade, and be resolved within thirty minutes of the start 
of the review.137 
 
C. Risk Management for Broker-Dealers with Market Access 
 
Because HFT compounds the impact of trading error, stringent 
pre-trade     risk     controls     are     necessary.138 Moreover,    the 
interconnectedness of the majority of financial markets allows trading 
errors to influence the whole market landscape.139 On November 15, 
2010, the SEC adopted rules prohibiting broker-dealers from granting 
“naked access” to an exchange and placing risk management controls  
on direct access given to customers.140 
HFT funds with naked access submit orders directly to an 
exchange, bypassing the broker-dealer’s trading system.141 Bypassing a 
broker-dealer’s trading system benefits HFT funds because it saves time 
and allows for “reduced latencies, and can facilitate more rapid 
trading.”142    An HFT fund, using naked access without its own of risk 
 
132. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 105. 
133. Id. 
134. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous 
Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56614–15. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers With Market Access, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240). 
139.    Id. at 69794. 
140.    Id. at 69792–93. 
141.    Id. at 69822. 
142.    Id. at 69793. 
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control, can submit orders to an exchange without review for mistakes  
or miscalculations.143 Shapiro likened “naked access” to “giving your  
car keys to a friend who doesn’t have a license and letting him drive 
unaccompanied.”144 
Direct access orders do not bypass the broker-dealer’s trading 
system. However, before direct access regulation, the SEC had not 
implemented uniform risk control rules for broker-dealers.145 For 
instance, some broker-dealers provided direct access without sufficient 
pre-trade risk resulting in the broker dealers offering HFT funds, in 
essence, naked access.146 The adopted rule decreases the likelihood of 
broker-dealers executing faulty orders by instituting uniform risk  
control rules.147 
Prohibiting naked access and putting risk controls on broker- 
dealers substantially diminishes the risks of an improperly executed 
order resulting in another flash crash.148 For example, assume a buy 
algorithm placed orders at a rate of 1,000 per second and mistakenly 
placed repetitive 300-share orders, instead of one single 300-share order 
at a price of $20 per share.149 A two-minute delay in unearthing the 
improperly executed algorithm would allow the algorithm to execute 
120,000 orders valued at $720 million instead of one order valued at 
$6,000.150 However, the prohibition  on “naked access”  and institution 
of pre-trade risk controls, together, prevent this outcome by blocking  
the unintended orders from reaching the exchange.151 
 
 
 
 
143.    Id. at 69794. 
144. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts New Rule Preventing 
Unfiltered Market Access (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010- 
210.htm. 
145. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75  
Fed. Reg. at 69794. 
146. Id. 
147. See id. (“For example, a system-driven pre-trade control designed to reject orders 
that are not reasonably related to the quoted price of the security would prevent erroneously 
entered orders from reaching the securities markets . . . .”). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. If 1,000 orders were placed every second, 120,000 orders could be placed in  
two minutes. Further, 120,000 orders consisting of 300 shares would result in 36 million 
shares purchased; 36 million shares valued at $20 dollars share would be valued at $720 
million. 
151. Id. 
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D. Large Trader Reporting 
 
On August 3, 2011, the SEC adopted a large trader reporting  
rule requiring traders of a certain size to report trading data to the 
SEC.152 While the SEC proposed the rule before the Flash Crash, the 
Flash Crash re-emphasized the importance of the SEC adopting a rule to 
“gather[] data on the most active market participants.”153 There are two 
separate ways a trader qualifies as large trader.154 First, a trader with an 
activity level greater than or equal to 2 million shares or any number of 
shares with a fair market value of $20 million or greater on any calendar 
day qualifies as a large trader.155 Second, a trader with an activity level 
greater than or equal to twenty million shares or any number of shares 
with a fair market value of $200 million or greater during any calendar 
month qualifies as large trader.156 
By attaching a unique identification number to each large trader, 
the rule “allow[s] the [SEC] to efficiently identify and analyze trading 
activity by the large trader.”157 Furthermore, large traders must provide 
transaction data—including every order, cancellation of an order, and 
modification of an order—on every transaction made on the morning 
after the transaction.158 
The large trader reporting rule provides the SEC with 
heightened oversight into the actions of large traders.159 The rule also 
allows the SEC to “reconstruct market events, conduct investigations, 
and [execute] enforcement actions as appropriate.”160 Because the CAT 
requires the same data as the large trader reporting rule from all broker- 
dealers, some members of the industry suggest the large trader reporting 
rule will become somewhat redundant when the CAT becomes fully 
effective.161 Because  the  SEC  believes  the  rule  will  complement the 
 
152.    17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-1 (2014). 
153. Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240 & 249). 
154.    Id. at 46966 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-1(a)(7) (2014)). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting 
Regime (July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. (quoting then Chairwoman Shapiro). 
161. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
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CAT and understands how long the SROs will need to fully implement 
the CAT, the SEC will not invalidate the rule.162 
 
E. Effectiveness of the Regulations 
 
Ultimately, no extreme market volatility followed the Flash 
Crash.163 Industry experts, however, differ on whether the new 
regulations provided this long term stability.164 For instance, a trader at 
Themis Trading suggested that a flash crash could happen at any time 
irrespective of the regulations.165 Conversely, a spokesman from BATS 
exchange opined that the mechanisms in place make a flash crash “far 
less likely.”166 Therefore, conclusively determining the effectiveness of 
these regulations is a difficult task because the exact set of 
circumstances present on May 6, 2010, are unlikely to repeat.167 It is 
possible, however, to look at the regulations individually to evaluate 
how each would have impacted the Flash Crash. 
First, during the height of the Flash Crash, the S&P 500’s 
decline of 8.6%168 was insufficient to trigger the previous market circuit 
breakers.169 The new post-Flash Crash market wide circuit breakers, 
however, pause trading at a 7% decline in the S&P 500.170 Therefore,  
the 8.6% decline would have resulted in a market wide trading pause.171 
The trading pause would have allowed investors the time to make 
informed decisions about market conditions, thereby reducing market 
 
 
162.    See id. at 45723–24. 
163. Matt Krantz, Four-year Flash Crash Anniversary Haunts Markets, USA TODAY 
MONEY (May 5, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/05/05/four- 
year-flash-crash-anniversary-haunts-markets/. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. See Edgar Ortega Barrales, Note, Lessons From the Flash Crash for the Regulation 
of High-Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1195, 1232–34 (2012) 
(indicating circumstances such as the Greece debt crisis also hovered over the stock market 
during the Flash Crash). 
168. Matt Jarzemsky & Michael Driscoll, New Circuit Breakers Would Have Halted 
Flash Crash, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 1, 2012, 5:27 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/06/01/new-circuit-breakers-would-have-halted-flash- 
crash. 
169. The Dow did not fall the requisite 10% needed to halt trading. See supra notes 94– 
123 and accompanying text. 
170. Jarzemsky & Driscoll, supra note 168. 
171. Id. 
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volatility.172 
Second, a study conducted by Yale researchers concluded that 
the limit up-limit down mechanism would have “adeptly halt[ed] stocks 
displaying up-down volatility,” if in place during the Flash Crash.173  
The study showed that the limit up-limit down mechanism would have 
paused trading in 60% of the 143 Russell 1000 stocks that experienced 
price changes beyond the 5% parameter.174  Furthermore,  the 
mechanism would have halted 80% of the tier 2 stocks—those not listed 
on the Russell 1000—that traded outside of the designated 
parameters.175 For example, the limit up-limit down mechanism would 
have paused Apple trading because its price fell 60% between 2:40 p.m. 
and 3:00 p.m.176 Overall, the limit up-limit down mechanism is  
effective, and would have limited the effects of the Flash Crash. 
Third, while clearly erroneous trade regulation cannot directly 
prevent a flash crash, it can decrease the effects of a flash crash.177 The 
regulations pertaining to clearly erroneous trades hope to boost investor 
confidence in the market during times of extreme market volatility, such 
as the Flash Crash.178 While investor confidence proves difficult to 
measure, industry sentiment suggests the regulation does boost investor 
confidence.179 
Fourth, the regulation on direct access focused substantially on 
preventing HFT funds from executing erroneous orders.180 A HFT fund 
using an algorithm designed with incorrect inputs substantially caused 
the Flash Crash.181 Because the direct access regulation provides 
safeguards on how HFT funds execute orders,182 it undoubtedly 
decreases   the    rate    of   improperly   executed   orders    reaching  an 
 
172. NYSE Market Model: Circuit Breakers, supra note 96. 
173. Bill Alpert & Lisa Stryjewski, Hitting the Switch on New Circuit Breakers, 
BARRON’S (Aug. 13, 2011), http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB500014240527 
02304718904576486604254916420. 
174. See id. 
175. Id. 
176. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 528. 
177. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly 
Erroneous Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56613, 56614 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
178. Id. 
179. Alpert & Stryjewski, supra note 173. 
180. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 69792, 69794 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
181. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
182. See id. 
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exchange.183 After the direct access regulation, a HFT fund must send  
an order to a broker-dealer with risk controls before the order reaches an 
exchange.184 The broker-dealer’s risk control could unearth the mistake 
in the algorithm and prevent a flash crash.185 
Fifth, the large trader reporting rule creates a more transparent 
market.186 The large trader reporting rule provides the SEC enhanced 
surveillance on the most active participants who are those able to most 
substantially affect the market.187 The rule’s lack of real time reporting 
limits the effectiveness in preventing a flash crash, yet effective 
surveillance over large traders leads to safer investment practices188 by 
giving the SEC more effective methods to detect illegal and deceptive 
action.189 On the whole, the regulations promulgated after the Flash 
Crash would have positive effects on either preventing the Flash Crash 
or limiting the Flash Crash once started. These regulations may also 
have successfully prevented many flash crashes since their enactment. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM PLAN TO CREATE A 
CONSOLIDATED AUDIT TRAIL 
 
The SEC adopted Rule 613 to allow the SEC to efficiently and 
accurately track all activity throughout the U.S. markets in NMS 
securities.190 The process of analyzing market events surrounding the 
Flash Crash lasted over four months.191 The non-existence of any 
comprehensive audit trail contributed heavily to the slow process of 
analyzing the few hours of trading during the Flash Crash.192   Before the 
 
183. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 69794 (describing how the risk control could prevent an improper order). 
184. Id. 
185. See id. (describing how the risk control could find mistakes in orders). 
186. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 157. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. 
190. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rule Requiring 
Consolidated Audit Trail to Monitor and Analyze Trading Activity (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483188#.VMmvPM9 
MvX4. 
191. See Nina Mehta, Exchanges to Ask SEC to Delay Audit-Trail Deadline, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Dec. 3, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2012-12-04/exchanges-to-ask-sec-to-delay-deadline-for-audit-trail-program. 
192. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified  at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
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implementation of Rule 613, the SROs and the SEC used a variety of 
data sources to “fulfill their regulatory obligation.”193 For example, 
FINRA members follow the Order Audit Trail System194 (“OATS”) 
rules and must record any “modification, cancellation or execution” of 
an order following transmission of the order to another FINRA 
member.195 Other exchanges, such as options exchanges use the 
Consolidated Options Audit Trail System.196 
The lack of a comprehensive audit trail, many different trading 
venues, and an immense amount of orders make it difficult for the SEC 
to oversee the U.S. securities markets.197 Additionally, HFT, along with 
the Flash Crash, increased the urgency to enact Rule 613.198 
Understanding Rule 613 requires an understanding of the goals and 
purposes that the NMS plan seeks to achieve through the CAT. 
While Rule 613 has several goals,199 this Note specifically 
examines the goal of improved market surveillance and  
investigations.200 Improved market surveillance and investigation 
deceases the chances of a flash crash by preventing the trades that 
precipitate a flash crash.201 The CAT achieves these goals by requiring 
account holders to each have a unique ID, tracking the key events of an 
order, requiring comprehensive reporting of orders, and making all 
NMS securities subject to the CAT.202 The goals, however, could be 
thwarted by the conflicts of interest Rule 613 creates. 
 
193.    Id. at 45726. 
194. FINRA describes OATS as an “integrated audit trail of order, quote, and trade 
information for all NMS stocks and OTC equity securities.” Order Audit Trail System 
(OATS), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OATS/ 
index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). “FINRA uses this audit trail system to recreate events 
in the life cycle of orders and more completely monitor the trading practices of member 
firms.” Id. 
195. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723. 
196.    Id. at 45728. 
197.    Id. at 45726. 
198. Herbert Lash, Plan for U.S. Securities Audit Trail Seen Delayed Again, REUTERS 
(Sept. 26, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/26/us-sec-flashcrash- 
delay-idUSKCN0HL27X20140926. 
199. Including analysis and reconstruction of the market during broad based events and 
general market analysis. Consolidated Audit Trail 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723. 
200. Id. 
201. See id. at 45723–24 (holding that the CAT will allow regulators to accurately track 
all activity in NMS securities). The trade that precipitated the Flash Crash was of an NMS 
security and, therefore, the CAT would contain data of the trade. See Investor Bulletin,  
supra note 94 (explaining that ETFs are NMS securities). 
202.    Id. at 45723–24. 
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A. Need and Objectives of the CAT to Achieve the Goals of the 
NMS 
 
In order to achieve the congressional goals203 of the NMS, the 
SEC and SROs need the ability to detect occurrences that threaten 
market integrity and efficiency.204 The recent advances in technology, 
and HFT comprising a majority of securities trades left the SEC and the 
exchanges in a challenging regulatory situation.205 The NMS plan via  
the CAT seeks to accomplish the goals of the NMS in the ever- 
advancing technological world.206 
The CAT improves market surveillance and investigations by 
first and foremost expanding the amount of data accessible to regulators 
by housing all trading data in the CAT repository and reducing the 
length of time necessary to retrieve the data.207  Currently regulators 
must request data from the broker-dealer, determine what format and 
definitions of the data the broker-dealer uses, and then analyze the data 
to determine if there is risk.208 Because the CAT utilizes a repository, 
instantly accessible to regulators, that will contain all NMS security 
order data, regulators no longer need to contact broker-dealers to  
receive order data.209 Furthermore, the NMS plan placing restraints on 
data format leads to quicker, more efficient, and more precise risk 
analysis.210 
On the other hand, the final rule contains a prohibition on the 
NMS plan from “mandating reporting audit trail data prior to 8:00 a.m. 
the next trading day.”211 The proposed rule, however, required an 
iteration of the CAT encompassing real time data.212 Disregarding the 
economic feasibility of real time data, the comment phase of the 
proposal suggested ways to produce a timelier and more accurate CAT 
 
203. See supra Part I. 
204. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45727 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified  at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
205. Consolidated Audit Trail, 75 Fed. Reg. at 45722. 
206. Id. 
207.    Id. at 45723-24. 
208.   Id. 
209.    Id. at 45724. 
210. See id. 
211. See Elisse B. Walter, The Final Rules for Consolidated Audit Trail, HARV. L.  SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 27, 2012, 9:12 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/27/the-final-rules-for-consolidated-audit-trail/ 
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rather than waiting until 8:00 a.m. the next day.213 Nevertheless, the 
final rule precludes the SROs and FINRA from exploring this option.214 
The CAT also improves market surveillance by requiring each account 
holder to have a unique ID.215 Without the CAT, determining who 
made a trade and at what time is a cumbersome process for the 
SEC.216 Current  SRO  audit  trail  data  only identifies  the “dates and 
times of trades by a particular broker-dealer,” not the identities of the 
customers who used the broker-dealer and executed the actual trades.217 
In order for regulators to identify the actual customers, the regulators 
must receive Electronic Blue Sheet218 (“EBS”) data and compare it to a 
SRO’s currently existing audit trail data, such as data compiled by 
FINRA  through  OATS.219 To   identify  the   time  the  actual  trade 
originated requires the regulators to obtain a third and separate set of 
data.220 The third set of data  becomes convoluted if single customers 
use many different brokers, potentially taking months to resolve.221 
Regulators, therefore, often bypass determining important details of the 
order to the detriment of policing schemes that cause extreme market 
volatility.222 
Some critics, however, opine that Rule 613 developed trader 
identification standards to lax to achieve the requisite oversight to 
control market volatility and police the markets.223 For instance, the 
original proposal required unique customer identifiers, whereas the final 
rule only requires the identification of the account holder.224 In some 
cases, the account holder ID only shows the entity on the account, 
instead of the individuals making the trades.225    The adopted iteration of 
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the CAT limits its ability to prevent future flash crashes by not requiring 
real time reporting and unique customer IDs. 
 
B. Conflicts in the NMS Plan 
 
The SEC pushed back the deadline to submit the NMS Plan to 
September 30, 2014,226 well over a year from the original deadline.227 
The SROs and FINRA pushed for extensions because of the required 
“significant work and analysis.”228 Further, members of the industry  
also campaigned on behalf of the SROs for an extension.229  The  
industry members’ reasoning centers around data security concern and 
the plan requiring a brand new reporting system, instead of updating an 
existing audit trail like OATS.230 
The SEC tasking the SROs (along with FINRA) with choosing 
the developer of the CAT and designing the implementation of the CAT 
could also lead to a delay.231 Because Rule 613 forces the SROs to fund 
the running and implementation of the CAT,232 delaying the CAT would 
save SROs money in the short term. The SROs, however, have the 
ability to pass the costs of implementing the CAT on to broker- 
dealers.233 The SROs met the September 30, 2014, deadline for 
submitting the NMS plan,234 yet the SROs still have not selected a 
bidder to develop and implement the CAT.235 Additionally, financial 
experts estimate that the implementation process of the CAT, once a 
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supra note 190. 
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234. See Joint NMS Plan Letter, supra note 32, at 1 (explaining that the SROs were 
required to file a joint NMS plan). 
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REUTERS (May 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/sec-cat-shortlist- 
idUSL1N0NZ2BU20140513. 
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bidder is accepted, will take three years.236 Because of the two delays 
and the final bidder to develop the CAT not being selected (it has been 
narrowed to six bidders),237 2018 would be the CAT’s earliest 
operational timeframe. 238 
An additional complication is the inherent conflict of interest 
between FINRA and the implementation of the CAT.239 Rule 613 
dictates that FINRA and the SROs must select the bidder to implement 
the CAT plan, yet FINRA also submitted a bid.240 FINRA, however, 
maintains it created a wall between the employees who are helping 
select the bidder and the employees working on FINRA’s individual 
bid.241 FINRA operating OATS also creates a conflict because the CAT 
most likely renders OATS useless.242 Additionally, some commentators 
believe FINRA could lose the power and sway it holds over market data 
if FINRA lost the bid.243 FINRA refutes this argument, insisting that its 
survival in no way depends on winning the CAT contract.244 Conflict or 
not, members of the industry opined that using a variation of OATS 
provides the most efficient and effective manner to implement the 
CAT.245 
VI. COSTS OF THE CAT 
 
Industry sentiment during the comment phase of Rule 613 
suggested two underlying issues: (1) privacy concerning the data the 
CAT collects in the repository, and (2) financial costs of implementing 
the CAT.246 The privacy concerns center around the sheer volume of 
data  the  CAT  will  possess,  specifically identification  of  the account 
 
236. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28. 
237. Lash, supra note 235. 
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239. Lash, supra note 235. 
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244. Id. (statement of Tom Gira, Executive Vice President for Market Regulation) (“ 
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245. See Comment Letter from Howard Meyerson, General Counsel, and  Vlad 
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holder making the trade.247 In some instances personally identifiable 
information, such as social security numbers or tax ID numbers, identify 
the account holder.248 While the number of account holders is not 
conclusively known, account holder IDs could number over 100 
million.249 The adopted version of Rule 613 eased some cost concerns 
because it does not require real time (same day) reporting or unique 
customer identification.250 Nevertheless, the SROs’  implementation 
costs and broker-dealers’ costs to adhere to Rule 613 are immense.251 
 
A. Privacy Concerns 
 
Rule 613 requires the CAT repository to house extraordinary 
amounts of data concerning traders.252 The CAT repository also 
inherently contains confidential data, such as market  participants’ 
trading strategies and, therefore, security of the data is important.253 
While it may be difficult to place a monetary value on this information, 
institutions fear misuse of the data or adverse entities acquiring the 
sensitive data.254 The benefits of the CAT could be outweighed if Rule 
613 does not effectively regulate the privacy of the reported data. 
For example, on January 2, 2015, the NYSE Group—a 
combination of NYSE and NYSE Arca—jointly recorded 3.9 million 
trades, the lowest number of trades recorded in 2015.255 Using 3.9 
million as the average daily volume, extrapolated for the entire year, 
results in a  yearly trade  volume  equaling 975  million.256     Each  trade 
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(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
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necessitates a buyer and seller purchasing and selling a security at a 
price, and Rule 613 dictates both that both require a unique account 
holder ID.257  The CAT repository contains the unique account holder  
ID for the entities who made the trade, the date of the trade, what 
security was traded, and the price of the trade.258 The 975 million trades 
that this hypothetical exhibits, however, highlight the amount of trades 
from only two of the eighteen259  national securities exchanges. 
Rule 613 also stipulates that the CAT must track every order  
and quote made on a NMS security, regardless of whether the order is 
executed.260 While every trade must have an accompanying order, some 
orders go unexecuted, thereby increasing the amount of data the CAT is 
required to house.261 Furthermore, the CEO from Boston Options 
Exchange stated they received “millions of quotes per day.”262 In sum, 
the amount of data the CAT will collect could be ten terabytes each 
day.263 The ten terabytes of data include countless trading strategies of 
many sophisticated investors.264 In order for Rule 613 to be justifiable, 
the CAT must effectively secure the data it contains.265 
Rule 613 addresses privacy concerns by mandating the NMS 
Plan to adhere to certain standards.266 Specifically, Rule 613 requires 
“[a]ll plan sponsors and their employees, as well as all employees of the 
central repository, [to] agree to use appropriate safeguards to ensure the 
confidentiality of such data  and [to] agree  not to use  such data  for any 
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purpose other than surveillance and regulatory purposes.”267 In addition 
to general language requiring the plan sponsor to adhere to certain data 
confidentiality standards, Rule 613 contains specific ways the plan 
sponsors must protect data.268 For example, Rule 613 requires the NMS 
Plan sponsors adopt rules that “(1) require information barriers between 
regulatory staff and non-regulatory staff with regard to access and use  
of data in the central repository, and (2) permit only persons designated 
by plan sponsors to have access to the data in the central repository.”269 
Rule 613 prevents confidential information from being “communicated 
to any personnel at an SRO that are engaged in non-regulatory or 
business activities.”270 Some industry members feared that third parties, 
including academia and individuals with fiduciary responsibility to 
shareholders, would be granted access to the CAT data.271 Conversely, 
other commentators maintain the benefits of granting third-party access, 
such as third-party analysis, contributing to the effectiveness of the 
SEC.272 The SEC, citing privacy concerns, however, refused to grant 
third party access to CAT data.273 In sum, the SEC understands the 
importance of confidentiality and included safeguards to inhibit leakage 
of confidential information in the framework of Rule 613.274 
 
B. Financial Costs for Both SROs and Broker-Dealers 
Necessitated by the NMS Plan 
 
As required by Rule 613, the eighteen SROs and FINRA 
submitted an NMS plan with detailed estimation of costs for both 
broker-dealers and the SROs.275 The SROs and FINRA developed the 
estimation via cost-related comments to the Rule 613 proposal, 
information provided by the six short listed bidders, and surveys 
distributed to  broker  dealers.276     The  six short  listed bidders provided 
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one-year cost estimates along with annual recurring costs. 277 
1. Broker-Dealer Costs to Adhere to Rule 613 
 
Approximately 50% of the 4,000 broker-dealers adhere to audit 
trail reporting obligations.278 Only 167 broker dealers responded to the 
survey, however, and only fifty-seven279  dealer-brokers  disclosed 
current reporting costs.280 Of the fifty-seven broker dealers, average 
annual change in implementation and maintenance costs to comply with 
CAT standards averaged approximately $346,000 for the twenty-four 
large broker-dealers (broker dealers possessing more than $500,000 in 
capital on a certain audit date) and $435,000 for thirty-three small 
broker-dealers.281 For broker-dealers without current reporting costs, 
cost estimations ranged between $0 and $20 million for one time 
implementation costs, and between $50,000 and $6 million for annual 
maintenance costs.282 In addition to reporting costs, one time hardware 
and software costs to broker-dealers for implementation of the CAT 
ranged from $13,200 to $5 million.283 Also, estimates for future 
surveillance hardware and software costs ranged from $125,000 to $17 
million per year.284 
Broker-dealers costs, however, are somewhat misleading 
because the NMS plan detailed that some, if not most, of the costs will 
be passed on to investors.285 Regardless, even assuming the highest 
averages for the 4,000 large and small broker-dealers, the total 
expenditures do not near the $1 trillion value loss at the height of the 
Flash Crash.286 Additionally, the costs associated with each broker- 
dealer is nominal relative to the SRO’s estimated costs. 
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multiplied by 4,000 broker-dealers, plus $20,000,000, would equal $112,000,000,000. See 
id. 
  
 
 
2015] AN OVERREACTION TO FLASH CRASHES 163 
2.  Costs to SROs for Implementing and Maintaining a CAT 
 
The six shortlisted bidders provided an estimated total cost of 
ownership to build, operate, and maintain the CAT.287 Each bidder 
anticipates that the actual cost estimates to build and maintain the CAT 
differ from the initial estimates.288 The bidders estimated “total  one- 
time cost to build the CAT, including technology, operational, 
administration, and any other material costs” ranging from $30 million 
to $91 million with an average of $59 million.289 Additionally, the 
bidders provided five-year annual recurring cost estimates following the 
selection of the winning bidder and an estimate of annual peak-year 
costs.290 The estimates for total five-year cost, for the first five years of 
operation, approximately ranged from $130 million to  $465  million 
with an average five year cost of $225 million and an average annual 
cost of $50 million.291 Peak-year cost estimates approximately ranged 
from $27 million to $110 million with an average of $60 million.292 
The bidders estimated costs are much lower than the SEC 
estimated $4 billion one- time cost and $2 billion annual recurring cost 
when it first proposed Rule 613.293 The substantially lower cost, 
however, could be a by-product of Rule 613 not requiring real-time 
reporting or unique customer IDs.294 Some industry members have 
suggested that not requiring real-time reporting or unique customer IDs 
will be to the detriment of the effectiveness of the CAT.295 While Rule 
613 solved privacy concerns and the NMS plan detailed relatively 
reasonable cost estimations, the CAT in its current iteration is not 
effective or necessary. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Five  years  later,  the  Flash  Crash  burns  bright  in  investor’s 
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minds.296 When almost a $1 trillion in market value dissipates in 
minutes, action will be taken.297 As HFT continues to dominate the 
market, regulators must develop effective regulatory methods.298 Rule 
613 seeks to regulate the entire market landscape in order to prevent 
extreme market volatility and increase transparency by having more 
effective market surveillance.299 While the CAT helps to achieve these 
goals, it leaves much on the table by not requiring real-time reporting or 
unique customer IDs.300 On the other hand, from a privacy standpoint 
Rule 613 took ample precaution in preventing misappropriation of 
sensitive data.301 Furthermore, from a cost standpoint the CAT is 
substantially less expensive than anticipated.302 
Regardless, prior regulations limit the need for the CAT. For 
example, the large trader reporting rule receives much of the same 
information the CAT receives in the same time frame.303 Additionally, 
the limit up-limit down mechanism and market wide circuit breakers 
would have halted much of the trading during the Flash Crash.304 
Combined, the regulations enacted prior to Rule 613 substantially limit 
the possibility of another flash crash.305 In its current iteration, the CAT 
is an overreaction to the danger of flash crashes. 
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